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Abstract—In our modern society comfort became a standard.
This comfort, especially in cars can only be achieved by equipping
the car with more electronic devices. Some of the electronic
devices must cooperate with each other and thus they require a
communication channel, which can be wired or wireless. In these
days, it would be hard to sell a new car operating with traditional
keys. Almost all modern cars can be locked or unlocked with a
Remote Keyless System. A Remote Keyless System consists of a
key fob that communicates wirelessly with the car transceiver
that is responsible for locking and unlocking the car. However
there are several threats for wireless communication channels.
This paper describes the possible attacks against a Remote
Keyless System and introduces a secure protocol as well as
a lightweight Symmetric Encryption Algorithm for a Remote
Keyless Entry System applicable in vehicles.
I. INTRODUCTION
A Remote Keyless Entry System consists of a key fob
and a car transceiver that is responsible for locking and
unlocking the car. Instead of locking or unlocking the car
with a traditional key the user presses a button on the key fob
to lock or unlock the car. Unfortunately the keyless cars are
”increasingly targeted by thieves” [1]. Criminals steal vehicles
”through the re-programming of remote-entry keys”. Thus,
some insurance companies have denied the insurance for this
issue. In addition a Remote Keyless System is vulnerable
against a Scan Attack, Playback Attack, Two-Thief Attack,
Challenge Forward Prediction Attack and a Dictionary Attack.
Another threat for Remote Keyless Entry Systems are On-
Board-Diagnose (OBD) key programmers.
A Scan Attack is critical for systems which use the rolling
code technique [2]. It can be performed against such systems
by sending different codes to the car transceiver as long as
the sent code matches with the code of the car transceiver.
This type of the attack is the simplest one. How long it takes
to unlock the car with this attack ”depends on the number of
bits in the random challenge, the random challenge-generation
method, and the number of trials conducted by the intruder”
[3].
Another possible attack against Remote Keyless Entry Sys-
tems is the so called Playback Attack [3]. Here, an intruder
has a device which is capable of recording messages sent
wirelessly. Later on, when the car driver is away, the intruder
can send the recorded messages to the car transceiver to unlock
the car.
The Two-Thief Attack [3] is the most known attack. In a
passive Keyless Entry System one thief stands next to the car
while the other one stands next to the car owner. Assume
that the car owner is hundred meters away from the car. Both
thieves use devices to amplify signals. The thief standing
next to the car pulls the door handle. By pulling the door
handle, the car transceiver sends an interrogation message to
the Customer-Identification Device (CID) [4] which is like a
key fob or a credit card, kept in the car owner’s pocket. Since
the CID is outside the transmission range, the amplifier of the
thief standing next to the car amplifies the signal so that it can
be received by the amplifier of the thief that stands next to the
car owner. From there it will be forwarded to the CID. The
CID responds with a valid code which will be transmitted to
the car transceiver over the amplifier devices of the thieves.
In the Challenge Forward Prediction Attack the intruder has
a device that records several interrogation messages that are
sent from the car transceiver when the door handle is pulled.
Based on the recorded interrogation messages the intruder tries
to predict the next one. Then the intruder can go to the car
owner and send the predicted interrogation message to the CID
located in the car owner’s pocket. The CID responds with
a message which will be recorded. Afterwards, the intruder
goes back to the car, pulls the door handle and plays back the
recorded message from the CID.
Cars can also get unlocked with copied car keys. There
are OBD key programmers that can be used to copy car
keys [5]. Assume that a thief goes to a car shop and asks
for a test drive. During the test drive the thief stops, plugs
the key programming device in the OBD and copies all key
information to a non-programmed key fob. After the test drive
the thief returns the car with the original car key. In the night
the thief goes again to the car shop and steals the car with the
copied key fob.
A further threat are jammers [6]. Jammers are devices that
emit signals in the same frequency range as key fobs to create
a strong interference that blocks the communication between
key fob and car transceiver. When the driver leaves the car and
presses the lock button on the key fob, the car will not lock
if there is an active jammer in the range of 30m. Although, in
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most of the cars the indicators blink two times after the car
has been locked, some people do not pay any attention to it.
After the driver has left the parking yard, the thief can open
the unlocked car and steal it by accessing the OBD interface.
II. FUNCTIONALITY OF THE PROPOSED PROTOCOL FOR A
SECURE REMOTE KEYLESS ENTRY SYSTEM
To implement this Lightweight Symmetric Algorithm for
a Remote Keyless Entry System the following requirements
must be fulfilled. First it is important that the microcontroller
used in the key fob and in the board computer has an Electrical
Erasable Programmable Read-Only Memory (EEPROM) with
4kB to store 2000 numbers with the size of 2 Bytes. Further-
more a strong Random Number Generator should be used to
avoid the prediction of random numbers. Another important
issue is the power consumption of the microcontroller and the
Radio Frequency (RF) unit inside the key fob because they
are battery-operated.
Fig. 1. Proposed Key Fob with Main Components.
The car must also have a board computer, equipped with
a car transceiver, for generating random numbers and for
sending them to the key fob. In addition the board computer
and the car transceiver must be connected to an accurate
current measurement, capable of detecting fluctuations from
one millisecond to another, in order to generate random
numbers. Furthermore, the key fob should also be able to gen-
erate random numbers. It is important that Random Number
Generators (RNGs) are used but not Pseudo Random Number
Generators (PRNGs) [7]. PRNGs generate random numbers
whose sequence will be repeated after some time while for
RNGs, the probability of repeated random number sequences
is vanishingly small. It is to mention that the proposed key
fob contains a button for locking the door, unlocking the door,
opening the boot and a programming interface (see Fig. 1). In
the central console there must be two interfaces through that
the key fobs can communicate with the board computer. At
certain time intervals the driver of the car will be informed
to update the key fobs. During the updating process the board
computer will generate new random numbers and write them
to the memory of the key fobs and the car transceiver. The
updating process works only, if both key fobs are connected
to the board computer.
When the car is delivered, the buyer gets two key fobs. The
board computer as well as the key fobs are pre-programmed.
Fig. 2. Memory Layout of the Key Fob and the Car Transceiver.
Fig. 2 represents the memory layout of the key fob and the
car transceiver. The size of the EEPROM is 4kB to store 2000
numbers in the range between 0 and 65535. The car key ID
is stored in a Read-Only Memory (ROM). It is a unique ID
that is assigned to each car.
In Fig. 3 a successful transaction for sending an instruction
command from the key fob to the car transceiver is illustrated.
When the driver presses a button on the key fob, the key fob
sends an encrypted car key ID to the car transceiver. There,
the received car key ID will be compared with the one stored
in the memory of the car transceiver. If the comparison was
successful, the car transceiver generates ten random numbers
in the range between 0 and 1999. These ten random numbers
are sent to the key fob. The first five random numbers are used
as indices for the memory locations containing the numbers
used to build a key, while the last five random numbers are
used as indices of the memory locations whose values are
needed for the encryption (see Fig. 5). The first five numbers
of the requested memory locations are sent encrypted and
appended to the car transceiver. When the car transceiver
receives the so called authentication message then it reads the
requested memory locations from its own memory, encrypts
and appends them to build its own authentication message.
Then it compares the own authentication message with the
received one.
If the comparison was successful, the car transceiver sends
an authentication ”OK” message to the key fob. After receiving
the authentication ”OK” message, the key fob sends the in-
struction command to the car transceiver which then processes
the requested instruction (lock/unlock car or open boot).
A successful transaction between car transceiver and key fob
for starting the car is shown in Fig. 4. When the driver presses
the start button it will send a request to the key fob to reply
with the car key ID stored in the memory of the key fob. The
key fob reads the car key ID, generates ten random numbers
in the range between 0 and 1999 and sends the car key ID
together with the ten generated random numbers to the car
transceiver. After receiving the car key ID, the car transceiver
Fig. 3. Successful Transaction for sending an instruction command from Key
Fob to car transceiver.
checks if the received car key ID matches with the own one. If
the comparison was successful, then the car transceiver builds,
based on the received random numbers, the authentication
message. Furthermore, it generates ten random numbers in the
range between 0 and 1999 before sending the authentication
message together with the ten generated random numbers to
the key fob. After receiving the authentication message, the
key fob builds its own authentication message and compares
it with the received one. If the comparison was successful, the
key fob will build the authentication message based on the
random numbers received from the car transceiver and sends
it to the car transceiver. The car transceiver builds its own
authentication message and compares it with the received one.
In case both authentication messages match, the start command
will be processed. It is to mention, that the authentication
process (A) is necessary to avoid that an attacker emulates a
car transceiver in order to get access to the memory locations
of the key fob.
The numbers that have been read from the requested mem-
ory locations can be encrypted using the proposed Lightweight
Encryption Algorithm (see Fig. 5) that works in the following
way. First the number of the sixth requested memory location
is added to the number of the first requested memory location.
Then the number of the seventh requested memory location is
added to the number of the second requested memory location.
This continues until the number of the tenth requested memory
location is added to the number of the fifth requested memory
location. This kind of encryption has the advantage that it
needs less computation power and it is easy to implement.
Fig. 6 illustrates the key exchange between the car transceiver
Fig. 4. Successful Transaction between car transceiver and Key Fob for
starting the car.
Fig. 5. The proposed Lightweight Encryption Algorithm.
and the two key fobs. As mentioned before the keys must be
updated at certain time intervals.
To exchange the keys (random numbers), both key fobs must
be connected to the hardware interfaces in the central console.
After entering the password of the board computer, the key fob
programming button becomes visible. By pressing the key fob
programming button, the board computer will send a car key
ID request to both car keys. If both car key IDs match, then the
board computer generates 2000 random numbers and transmits
them to both key fobs where they are stored in the EEPROM
memory. If the random numbers have been successfully saved
in both key fob memories then the board computer writes the
random numbers to its own EEPROM memory.
Fig. 6. Successful Transaction between car transceiver and Key Fob for
exchanging random numbers.
In the previous described transactions between car transcei-
ver and key fob(s) it was always assumed that all the steps in
the transaction went fine. However some steps can fail. It can
happen that the car key ID does not match, the comparison
of the received encrypted message fails or a memory problem
occurs when updating the key fobs with new keys (random
numbers). These problems can be handled in the following
way. If a wrong car key ID is received many times within a
short time interval, it can be ignored because on a big parking
yard there might be many cars which are opened and closed.
However, when receiving a wrong encrypted authentication
message from a key fob many times within a short time
interval, then the risk of an Intrusion Attack is very high
because this step is only reached when the right car key ID
was sent. In this case the system could be put in a blocked
state after receiving three wrong authentication messages for
three minutes, before it reacts to new key fob commands.
The memory problem that can occur when updating the key
fobs with new keys (random numbers) can be solved in the
following way. If a writing process of the keys to one of the
key fobs fails then it should be repeated. In case it still fails,
then the writing process should be stopped but only if the
other key fob has not been programmed yet. Otherwise, the
already programmed key fob must be re-programmed with the
old keys.
Fig. 7. A proposed security mechanism against jamming.
In section one, the operation of a jammer has been intro-
duced. Fig. 7 represents the flow chart of the proposed security
mechanism against jamming. After the motor is switched off
the board computer will check if a door has been opened
and closed. In case a door was opened and closed the board
computer will check if a ping reply or a lock command has
been received. If no ping reply or lock command has been
received within ten seconds then the car will honk five times
and the driver has ten seconds time before the car gets locked
automatically. This prevents the car of being unlocked after a
Jamming Attack.
III. COMPARISON BETWEEN DIFFERENT AUTHENTICATION
TECHNIQUES APPLIED IN KEY FOBS
For Remote Keyless Entry Systems there are three authen-
tication techniques that are mainly used [3].
One technique is called Fixed Code Technique. A device,
using this technique has a fixed pre-programmed code. When-
ever an event is triggered, the device sends its fixed code to
the receiver.
Another technique used for the authentication of Remote
Keyless Entry Systems is the Rolling Code Technique. In
this technique both, the transmitter (key fob) and the receiver
(car) maintain a sequence counter. If a button is pressed,
then the content of the sequence counter is sent encrypted
to the receiver. There, the received encrypted value of the
sender’s sequence counter is decrypted and compared with
the receiver’s own sequence counter. If the difference between
the values of both sequence counters is in a certain range, the
received code is valid. It is to mention, that a shared secret
key is used for the encryption and decryption.
The Challenge-Response Technique is a widely used tech-
nique. A secret key is shared between two transceivers. In case
the driver pulls the door handle, the car transceiver transmits
a random number, the so called random challenge, to the CID.
There the received random challenge is going to be encrypted
before it is sent back to the car transceiver. In the meanwhile
the car transceiver has also encrypted the random challenge
sent to the CID and compares it with the received one. If they
match a certain operation is performed.
According to [3], the previous mentioned authentication
techniques are vulnerable against different types of attacks
such as Scan Attack, Playback Attack and Forward Prediction
Attack. Table I shows the level of success of each attack type
against the mentioned authentication techniques and against
our propsed protocol. The levels are easy (0), difficult (1),
very difficult (2) and extremely difficult (3).
TABLE I
LEVEL OF DIFFERENT ATTACKS VS. AUTHENTICATION TECHNIQUES
Fixed
Code
Rolling
Code
Challenge
Response
Our
proposed
Protocol
Scan Attack 1 1 2 3
Playback Attack 0 1 2 3
Fwd. Pred. Attack 0 1 2 3
IV. BENEFITS AND DRAWBACKS OF THE PROPOSED
PROTOCOL
The introduced protocol has several advantages among
common protocols used in Secure Remote Keyless Entry
Systems. One advantage is the easy implementation of the in-
troduced protocol and of the lightweight encryption algorithm.
In addition the lightweight encryption algorithm requires less
computation power and thus it is energy efficient. The authenti-
cation response message is built from three randomly selected
decimal numbers each in the range between 0 and 65535. This
means that the message length can be up to 80 bits long. Thus
it is almost impossible to guess the requested authentication
response message. Since the authentication response message
changes for every request, the probability of guessing the right
authentication response message is 1280 . Another big advantage
is that if someone borrows the car to make a test drive with
the purpose of cloning a car key, the person might not be able
to steal the car in the night from the salesman’s yard, if the
salesman has re-programmed the key fobs after the test drive.
In the proposed Remote Keyless Entry System, the driver
has to press a button on the key fob to open or lock the car.
This prevents the system from a Two-Thief Attack. Further-
more, with the proposed system it is almost impossible to
become a victim of a Scan, Playback or a Challenge Forward
Prediction Attack, since the authentication message consists of
encrypted decimal numbers from randomly selected memory
locations.
For a successful Scan Attack, the 32 bit car key ID, the
always changing 80 bit authentication message and the timing
must be correct before sending the instruction command to
unlock the car. Hence, it is extremely difficult to attack the
proposed protocol with a Scan Attack.
For a successful Playback Attack, the attacker must hope
that the recorded sequences of ten random numbers, used to
access the values of ten memory locations in order to build
the authentication message, will occur again. Since RNGs are
used, the probability of repeated random number sequences
is very small and thus it is extremely difficult to attack the
proposed protocol with a Playback Attack.
Attacking the proposed protocol with a Forward Prediction
Attack is extremely difficult because the authentication mes-
sage is built from the values of ten randomly selected memory
locations. The indices of that memory locations are generated
with a RNG and thus it is almost impossible to predict the
sequence of the generated random numbers.
One drawback of the proposed protocol is, that the owner is
responsible for updating the key fobs with new keys (random
numbers). When the board computer displays a request for
updating the key fobs then the owner has to plug both key fobs
into the interfaces located at the central console, so that they
can be programmed with the new keys. How often new keys
should be written to the key fobs depends on how often the
key fob(s) is/are used or at latest after a certain time interval.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper we have introduced a Protocol for a Secure
Remote Keyless Entry System applicable in Vehicles. For
the encryption, symmetric cryptography is used. The system
consists of a car transceiver and a key fob with programming
interface. To process a command like unlock the car, the
transceiver first requests the key fob to authenticate. This
authentication is done by requesting the key fob to send
an authentication message that is built from the content of
ten randomly selected memory locations. The car transceiver
builds its own authentication message and compares it with
the received one. It is assumed that key fob as well as the
car transceiver have an EEPROM where the shared keys are
stored. To synchronize the content of the EEPROM of key
fob and car transceiver, the programming interface is used. In
this paper we have also compared our proposed protocol with
existing authentication techniques applied in key fobs. We can
conclude that the probability of hacking our proposed protocol
with a Scan Attack, Playback Attack, Forward Prediction At-
tack or a Two-Thief Attack is extremely difficult. Furthermore,
due to the lightweight encryption algorithm the processors in
the car transceiver and in the key fobs need less computation
power and thus the system becomes more energy efficient.
More optimization techniques and mathematical proofs are left
for the future work.
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